Abstract: This research investigates the utility of Ostrom and Crawford's rule classification framework (elaborated in Understanding Institutional Diversity) in the systematic study of rule systems in a set of relatively complex open source projects and their overarching non-profit foundation. Using this framework, Rule configurations are described for the overall Open Source Geospatial Foundation and for each of seven associated geospatial projects.
An open source primer
For readers who may be unfamiliar with the concept, "open source" refers to computer software codethe logic of the computer programs that make the computer do what it does -that is made available, open access and readable. The innovation of open source can be traced back to the mid-1980s to Richard Stallman, a programmer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Stallman, emphasized that the digital nature of software and the low cost for sharing (particularly across the Internet), meant that code should be treated more as a public good than a private one. Moreover, users of software should also be, by default, given the freedoms to use, read and modify this software and to distribute the software as they deem necessary (Stallman, 1999 (Stallman, , 2002 . This came to be known as "Free\Libre" (FL) software (Ghosh et al., 2002) .
However, what really was Stallman's brilliant innovation was his use of copyright law to ensure that the software he was working on, called the GNU operating system, granted its users the freedom to:
• run the software;
• read the software source code and modify it;
• redistribute the original version of the software; and
• redistribute modified versions of the program (Stallman, 1999) .
Access to the source code is required in order for all but the first right to be realized. These freedoms, when applied through a software copyright license, often mandate that future versions of the software carry the same attributes. Based on these ideas, Stallman created a software license that included these principles referred to as the General Public License or GPL. There are a number of other licenses that have slightly different terms than the GPL, but are considered "GPL-compatible" (Free Software Foundation, 2009b) . There are others that are less compatible to the freedoms described above, and the differences often have to do with added restrictions provided in OS license variants that may limit the freedom of users in what they can do with the software (Perens, 1999) . The term open source is used for code that falls under this category. But for our purposes, we will use open source to describe all types of software -free/libre or non-GPL compatible open source software.
The freedoms to copy, modify, and distribute readable software source code found in open source provides two potential advantages over the traditional proprietary, full-copyright approach to software development. First, all open source software packages are provided at no monetized cost to the end-user.
This creates a powerful incentive for them to be used, particularly in settings where software budgets are small (Hahn, 2002) . Second, by providing readable source and permitting new derivations to be created based on this source code, the projects could, in theory, generate a large community of users and developers (Raymond, 2001 (Benkler, 2006) , but one that differs from the environmental commons that readers here may be familiar with (e.g., Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990) . In open source commons, groups of people act collectively to produce a public good, i.e., the software, rather than over-appropriate the resource (e.g., Hardin, 1968) .
The key question we have been asking in our research on open source is how do these Internet-based and often transnational collaborations in software operate? What kinds of governance structures and systems of rules are in place and how do they evolve?
The work presented here is a subset of a larger research program that is cumulating in the production of a book, entitled The Success and Abandonment of Open Source Commons that we expect to publish sometime in 2011. In this paper, we provide results from one case study of a nonprofit foundation and seven open source projects all in the area of geospatial technologies. Here we investigate the utility of Elinor Ostrom and Susan Crawford's rule classification framework (see Chapter 7 in Ostrom, 2005) to describe the rule systems that are found in this particular network of Internet-based commons.
Ostrom's (and Crawford's) rule classification framework
We are making the assumption that many readers of this special issue will already be familiar with the Institutional Analysis and Development framework that has provided a theoretically-based scaffolding that has helped structure many projects undertaken by Lin and her colleagues (Ostrom, 2005:6; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994) . Because of space limitations, we will just summarize briefly IAD here and describe how they apply in open source circumstances (see Schweik, 2005 for more information on IAD applied in an open source context).
In IAD, the "Operational level" is a general name for rules that influence the everyday decisions and actions of project participants. In an open source setting, in part from what we've learned through our Applying Elinor Ostrom's Rule Classification Framework ongoing study, these tend to be norms or more formal rules that specify how the further development and support of the software may proceed.
The second institutional level in IAD is referred to as "Collective Choice." This level can be thought of as two general types of rules that "oversee" operational-level rules and structures (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994) . The first type specifies who is eligible to undertake certain operational-level activities. For example, in open source commons, most projects will likely have a norm or rule specifying who has the authority to promote new or revised software code changes to the "next release" library (Fogel and Bar, 2003) . In some projects, there may only be one or two people on the team and as a consequence, one or both have this authority. In larger team settings, this authority could be centralized or distributed, depending on the project. The second type of Collective-Choice rules specify who can change operational-level rules and the procedure to make such changes. For example, if a project grows in terms of developer team size, there may be a need to change the Operational-level rule describing how code gets checked in or "committed." Collective-Choice rules would determine how an existing operational procedure would be changed.
The "highest" level in these nested institutions is referred to as "Constitutional-level" rules. One constitutional provision in open source projects is the particular copyright license used (described earlier).
But Constitutional-level rules also specify who is allowed to change Collective-Choice rules and the procedures for making such changes. This situation might arise in an open source setting when the recognized leader of a project decides to move on to a new opportunity. Constitutional-level rules could specify who takes over this person's position.
One of the advances Ostrom and her colleague Sue Crawford made in Understanding Institutional
Diversity (Ostrom, 2005 , Chapter 7) was adding further detail or structure to help analysts classify or organize rules found in commons settings at any or all of these levels. In this work, Ostrom and Crawford present seven rule categories: Position, Boundary, Choice, Aggregation, Information, Payoff and Scope. (2) the process that determines which participants may enter (entry rules), such as by invitation, through some sort of competition, or compulsory; (3) how an individual can leave a position (exit rules).
Committee Chair Charter v. Other Members Boundary Rules
There may be also rules regarding the relationship between multiple positions, such as a mandate that no one person can hold multiple positions at the same time.
Choice Rules
Specify what participants in positions must, must not or may do in their position and in particular circumstances. Choice rules focus on actions.
Bylaws for BOD; Bylaws for OfficersComm rules/policies
Incubation process
Aggregation Rules
Determine whether a decision by a single or multiple participants is needed prior to an action at a decision point in a process.
Aggregation rules are needed whenever choice rules provide multiple positions partial control over the same sort of actions.
Aggregation rules can be symmetric (e.g., unanimity) or nonsymmetric (where a leader can make a decision for a group) and each also must include a non-agreement rule.
Symmetric:
Consensus in Committees
Nonsymmetric:
BOD creates committees
Specify the channels used to communicate information among participants, as well as what kinds of information can be transmitted by what positions. There may also be rules specifying required frequency of interaction, or specifying an official language.
Required Meeting MinutesRequired Mee Notification Annual Meetings Required

InformationRul
Financial Statements Required
Payoff Rules
Assign external rewards or sanctions for particular actions or outcomes. For example, some payment for completion of a task.
Executive Director and others can be paid; BOD cannot be paid
Scope Rules
Organizational Mission Specify which outcomes may, must, or must not be affected within a situation. Scope rules focus on outcomes (compared to choice rules which focus on actions).
Committee Mission
Applying Elinor Ostrom's Rule Classification Framework we briefly summarize our empirical work investigating how these types of rules fit in the context of an open source "federation" of projects.
The Open Source Geospatial Foundation, its associated projects and research methods
There are many types of open source technologies. In some instances, developers from these projects have created nonprofit foundations to, in part, "enable collaboration between a community of individuals and corporate actors" (O'Mahony, 2005:393) . Here, we focus our attention on one such nonprofit called the Open Source Geospatial Foundation, which supports open source projects specifically working on geospatial technologies, such as desktop or web-based Geographic Information Systems software.
According to the Foundation's website (OSGeo, 2009a) , the Open Source Geospatial Foundation is a non-profit organization who supports and promotes the collaborative development of open source geospatial software technologies. The foundation provides financial, legal and organizational support to projects that are formally associated with the organization. It also provides outreach and advocacy services for these software projects.
As of December, 2009, OSGeo lists 21 affiliated projects, some of which are fully "accepted" projects while others are in "incubation," meaning they are working to become fully OSGeo sanctioned projects.
In the summer of 2008 we conducted semi-structured elite interviews with representatives from seven of their associated software projects (except in one project which was discontinued or abandoned where we were able to conduct only one interview), and also interviewed the OSGeo Foundation's executive director. Usually, for each specific software project, we interviewed the formal or informal project leader and one other "core developer." We chose this approach because our interview questions were complex and required a good knowledge of institutional history of each project. We used Skype or the telephone to conduct interviews. Interviewees are located in the United States (Alaska, Arizona and Massachusetts), Canada (British Columbia and Ontario), Europe (Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany and France) and Australia. In the analysis that follows, we will keep the project names anonymous and we have identified them as A, B, C, D, E, F and G.
Using the Ostrom/Crawford rule classification framework to articulate
OSGeo's system of rules
In the OSGeo context, there are two "scales" of analysis required: rule systems at the Foundation scale, and rule systems at the individual project scale.
OSGeo Foundation rules Charles M. Schweik and Meelis Kitsing
The OSGeo foundation and its projects have a diverse institutional framework consisting of all the rule categories we highlighted above. As the space is limited, we will offer a brief summary of our key findings.
OSGeo 
Individual OSGeo project rules
Let us now turn to the rules that exist within the seven individual software OSGeo projects that we interviewed. Given our space limitations, we will not detail all identified rules and at specific Operational, Collective-choice or Constitutional levels in IAD. Our intentions here are only to show that these various rules exist and that are can be mapped on the basis of Ostrom's rule categories. Table 2 provides this summary, with each of the seven projects, compared and contrasted, side by side. Beginning with Position Rules (positions people hold), then there is little variation; all projects have a Project Steering Committee or Project Management Committee (these labels imply the same thing) and an informal group of core developers that often overlaps with the formal management committee. However, there are no formal leaders in two projects (C and G). Project (C) was abandoned in the summer of 2008.
All seven projects have formal Boundary Rules, which stipulate who are eligible and how people enter or leave positions. However, often projects rely on social norms in their governance instead of these formal rules. Similarly, the mapping of Choice Rules, which describe actions people can take in various positions, indicate that project participants follow primarily social norms. Our study of Aggregation Rules concerning how key decisions are made show that all projects have steering or management committees.
Formally, these committees use voting as its decision-making method and only committee member votes count. However, most decisions are made through consensus and issues are settled through Internet-based discussion. Most interestingly, in one case, all developers actually vote but only the votes of designated committee members count. Thus, key decisions about project direction are primarily managed via social norms rather than more formal voting structures. According to one project leader, large number of formal rules can de-motivate programmers to take part in the project. In other words, managing the project on the basis of formal rules can make it difficult to keep the current developers and attain new developers, reflecting the idea of "formal rules as friction" (Schweik and English, 2007) . Scope Rules found in Table 1 are ones that specify which outcomes may, must, or must not be affected within a situation. Scope rules focus on outcomes in comparison to choice rules which focus on actions.
Our interviewees pointed out that outcomes depend on the technical design of the project. There were no formal rules related to technical design outcomes. Scope Rules are articulated primarily through informal norms related to software functionality outcomes and are written in standard communication channels.
In short, Table 2 provides a summary of the formal rules and informal norms across all these seven cases.
Although all these cases are part of OSGeo foundation framework, variation does exist within most rule categories. As far as Position Rules are concerned the existence or lack thereof of a designated leader appears to make a difference. The two projects without a designated lead face more challenges (one is 
Conclusion
Our goal in this short paper was to demonstrate the utility of Ostrom and Crawford's rule classification system for analyzing the institutional designs of open source projects. This analysis provides convincing evidence that this classification system can be used in these contexts. As the world continues to move toward Internet-based commons to support transnational collective action and collaboration, a standardized classification system to aid in systematically articulating and analyzing institutional designs will become increasingly important. Ostrom and Crawford's system provide a useful, and we think important, step forward. The challenge is how one can successfully interview and investigate more specifics about established rule systems in a thorough yet efficient method. Readers interested in more information about this particular case and other related research we have done related to this project are encouraged to look for our upcoming book entitled Success and Abandonment in Open Source Commons that we hope will be published sometime in 2011.
